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Volume XXVII FEBRUARY, 1942 Number 2
IMPLIED COVENANTS BETWEEN OTHERS
THAN LESSORS AND LESSEES
MAURICE H. MERRILL*
Most cases in which the doctrine of implied covenants arises
grow out of controversies between lessors and lessees. In a
variety of situations, however, the control over mineral exploita-
tion of a tract of land may be in the hands of one person, while
there are others who are beneficially interested in the prompt
and efficient prosecution thereof. The conflict of interest between
these persons may be quite as real as that between the lessors
and the lessees for the police of which the doctrine of implied
covenants was evolved. Increasingly the courts are being faced
with the claim that the doctrine applies to these situations as
well. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the decisions
to date and to endeavor to suggest the considerations which
should influence the judicial approach to this problem.
GRANTORS AND GRANTEES
The owner of a tract of land may convey the mineral rights
therein, reserving to himself a royalty interest. Except for the
fact that the mineral interest is transferred in perpetuity, this
transaction does not differ greatly from the ordinary oil and
gas lease, upon a royalty basis. In each case the grantor has an
interest the value of which is dependent upon prompt and effi-
cient development and operation. Where no substantial consider-
ation moves to him at the time of the transfer, there has been
judicial recognition of the fact that the law should throw the
protection of the implied covenant doctrine around his claim to
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma School of Law.
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have the mineral resources developed in due course.1 On the other
hand, where a substantial sum has been paid him at the time of
the grant, two decisions by Courts of Civil Appeals in Texas deny
the applicability of the implied covenants.2 West Virginia has
come to the same conclusion in a case involving a conveyance of
solid minerals.3 The reason for this distinction is not evident.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals well expressed the case for ex-
tending the implied covenant doctrine in favor of the grantor
of the mineral interest when it said: "Under such a contract
the consideration is a continuing one, to be paid only by the
labor of the grantee in the development of the property. The
grantor has a continuing interest in the estate conveyed, and
the grantee is not at liberty to do with the property as he pleases.
He cannot use or fail to use it to the prejudice of the grantor
who has rights that must be respected."4 These reasons seem
as cogent in their application to him who receives a present sum
in money as to him who does not. That portion of the considera-
tion which depends upon production is no less "continuing" in
character by reason of the substantial cash payment. The grantor
was 'not content with the cash alone. He stipulated for a share
in future production. It never has occurred to anyone that the
payment of a substantial cash bonus for the execution of a lease
precludes the existence of the implied covenant obligations in
favor of the lessor. In fact, there is direct authority to the con-
trary.' It is submitted that there is nothing in the fact that the
mineral rights are transferred by a perpetual grant which should
give rise to a distinction not recognized in respect to transfers
by lease.
What I have just indicated to be the better rule was given
express recognition by the Fort Worth, Texas, Court of Civil
Appeals in Powell v. Daneiger Oil & Refining Company.d The
judgment in that case but recently has been reversed by the
1. Eastern Kentucky Min. & Timber Co. v. Swanm-Day Lbr. Co. (1912)
148 Ky. 82, 146 S. W. 438, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672.
2. Doehring v. Gulf Prod. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 8 S. W. (2d) 723
(resting in part upon an express stipulation against implied covenants);
Loomis v. Gulf Oil Corp. (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 123 S. W. (2d) 501.
3. Feather v. Bairl (1920) 85 W. Va. 267, 102 S. E. 294.
4. Eastern Kentucky Min. & Timber Co. v. Swanm-Day Lbr. Co. (1912)
148 Ky. 82, 89, 146 S. W. 438, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672.
5. Ezzell v. Oil Associates (1930) 180 Ark. 802, 22 S. W. (2d) 1015.
6. (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 134 S. W. (2d) 493.
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Supreme Court of Texas in an opinion which seems destined to
confuse rather than to clarify the law.7 The discussion com-
mences with a statement that, "An implied covenant must rest
entirely on the presumed intention of the parties as gathered
from the terms as actually expressed in the written instrument
itself, and it must appear that it was so clearly within the con-
templation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to
express it, and therefore omitted to do so, or it must appear that
it is necessary to infer such a covenant in order to effectuate the
full purpose of the contract as a whole as gathered from the
written instrument. It is not enough to say that an implied
covenant is necessary in order to make the contract fair, or that
without such a covenant it would be improvident or unwise, or
that the contract would operate unjustly."8 The first part of the
statement, of course, has no significance as applied to the doc-
trine of implied covenants in mineral leases where the nature
of the subject matter precludes that the parties should contem-
plate clearly what is to be done.9 The second portion is fairly
acceptable as a statement of the foundation of the mineral doc-
trine,10 were it not for the denial that fairness and justice be-
tween the parties is an essential element. The Supreme Court
of Texas earlier had approved a statement which recognized the
importance of this factor in determining what is necessary to
realize the presuppositions of the lease.1 The present opinion
suggests a reversal of viewpoint, and gives an apparent approval
to the notion that the implied covenants are implied in fact rather
than in law.12 The entire opinion seems written under the influ-
ence of this idea, which, as I have suggested elsewhere, 3 is
utterly inconsistent with the factual situations to which the doc-
trine of implied covenants is applied. The confusion resultant
from this conception appears as the court proceeds expressly to
say that there may be an implied covenant for development al-
7. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell (Tex. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 632.
8. Id. at 635.
9. See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. 1940) §2.
10. Id. at §§17, 61, 73, 94, 221-223.
11. W. T. Waggoner Est. v. Sigler Oil Co. (1929) 118 Tex. 509, 19 S. W.(2d) 27.
12. See Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an
Oil and Gas Lease in Texas (1933) 11 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 402, cited in the
principal opinion.
13. See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. 1940)
§220.
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though the transaction takes the form of conveyance rather than
of lease, and then, inconsistently, makes the statement that there
is less occasion for imposing the implied covenant obligation un-
der a grant than under a lease. Why this should be so is not
readily apparent, and the succeeding discussion brings no en-
lightenment.
The court makes, only substantially to reject, the point that
the grant is unlimited in time while the lease is for a term. The
wisdom of the retreat is obvious. Many leases are made for long
fixed terms. Every lease potentially may endure until the oil
beneath the land is exhausted. Many early instruments drafted
in the form of an absolute conveyance of the oil beneath the land,
without limitation as to term, have been treated as leases and
under them the lessee has been subjected to the implied covenant
obligations.-4 Finally, in the state of Texas every lease executed
in the common form amounts to a conveyance of the minerals in
place, subject to being defeated upon certain conditions.1 What-
ever the form of the instrument, the right to exploit the oil re-
sources is placed in one man's hands and a right to a share of
the product is placed in another's. The potential conflict of inter-
ests thus created jeopardizes the non-operator's position as
greatly in one case as in the other, and it was to prevent the oper-
ator from serving his own ends at the expense of the non-opera-
tor's legitimate claims that the courts devised the doctrine of
implied covenants. Hence the reasons of policy upon which it
rests are as strong in the one case as in the other, and no sig-
nificance should be attached to differences in the length of the
term.
More reliance is placed on the assumed distinction that "the
predominating purpose of a lease is to secure the exploitation
and development of the property for the purposes set out in the
lease," while "conveyances of minerals are frequently actuated
by a motive of investment on the part of the grantee and the
cash consideration or other down payment is the moving cause
for the conveyance by the grantor."' 6 This, it is submitted, is
14. Gadbury v. Ohio & Ind. Consol. Nat. & Ill. Gas Co. (1903) 162 Ind.
9, 67 N. E. 259, 62 L. R. A. 895 is an example.
15. See Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an
Oil and Gas Lease in Texas (1929) 7 Tex. L. Rev. 539, 554.




an assumption which may or may not be true, according to the
facts of the particular case. No doubt if it can be shown that
the instrument was not executed with an intent to procure a
speedy development of the land, there is reason to say that the
presupposition lying back of the covenant for exploration is ab-
sent. It is on this ground that the great weight of authority
denies the existence of that covenant as against the privilege of
deferring exploration created by a delay rental provision.
1 7 It
might be argued, although less plausibly that evidence of in-
difference toward prompt exploitation cuts the ground from be-
neath the covenant for further development, as well. But there
is no reason to believe that, once production is obtained, claims
for diligent operation and for protection against drainage may
be disregarded. And even as to exploration itself the question
of the presence or absence of the desire for development as a
motivating factor surely is a question to be determined from the
evidence in the particular case. Its absence is not to be presumed
from the payment of a substantial money consideration, as the
Supreme Court of Texas previously has held by necessary im-
plication. 8 It would be as sound to infer that the payment of
a large bonus for a lease indicates that the lessor does not want
development, and we know that is not the law.19 The proper
analysis of the problem would seem to be that the grantor's stip-
ulation for a royalty interest in addition to the cash considera-
tion for the grant is an indication that he does want development,
to be overcome only by definite proof to the contrary, a proof
which was lacking in the case under discussion, wherein the
grant was executed after development was undertaken in the
general territory, and in which the grantee was not an investor
but an active oil operator.
Finally, the court lays emphasis upon a clause in the instru-
ment giving to the grantee "the right at any time to prospect and
develop * * * subject only to the limitations and covenants here-
17. See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d. ed. 1940)§28.
18. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co. (1928) 117
Tex. 439, 6 S. W. (2d) 1039, 60 A. L. R. 890. Cf. W. T. Waggoner Est. v.
Sigler Oil Co. (1929) 118 Tex. 509, 19 S. W. (2d) 27.
19. Ezzell v. Oil Associates (1930) 180 Ark. 802, 22 S. W. (2d) 1015;
W. T. Waggoner Est. v. Sigler Oil Co. (1929) 118 Tex. 509, 19 S. W. (2d)
27.
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inafter set forth."20 The court indicates its belief that, as the
document contains no express provision for any set program
of development, these words constitute an express stipulation
against the implied covenant obligation. The language itself
seems inapt to convey such a meaning. Similar phraseology has
been employed in many oil leases under which the courts have
recognized the implied covenant obligation as existing.21 Now
to give them this meaning seems to fly in the face of the estab-
lished doctrine that agreements in derogation of implied cove-
nants are to be strictly construed.2 2 It is regrettable that the
Supreme Court of Texas which has played so significant a part
in the development of the law of implied covenants should lend
its countenance to a view that opens the door to the perpetration
of grave injustice against persons whose interests need and merit
the protection of that law. It seems proper to suggest that the
Powell case23 ought not to be followed in other jurisdictions.
Suppose, instead of a sale of the oil rights, we have a sale
of the land itself, with a reservation of a part of the oil interest.
Here I think we must realize that there are two possible situa-
tions. The transaction may be a sale of the land to a grantee
who is interested primarily in exploiting it for agricultural or
other purposes, the grantor seeking to retain a share in a pos-
sible future mineral development. In such a case the parties do
not contemplate that the grantee will embark upon a career of
exploration or development and there is no reason for implying
any covenant to do so, since fair dealing does not call for it. In
other words, we have a situation that really presents the factors
which the Supreme Court of Texas seems to have read into the
Powell case. 24 On the other hand, the sale may be to an operator
for the express purpose of promoting the exploitation of the
mineral wealth. In such a case it seems clear that the implied
covenants should operate in favor of the grantor and against the
grantee. The Supreme Court of Texas has so held in a case
involving land valuable for sulphur 25 and there seems no good
20. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell (Tex. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 632,
636.
21. Emery v. League (1903) 31 Tex. Civ. App. 474, 72 S. W. 603.
22. See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. 1940),
§§199-200.
23. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell (Tex. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 632.
24. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell (Tex. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 632.
25. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co. (1928) 117
Tex. 439, 6 S. W. (2d) 1039, 60 A. L. R. 890.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/2
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reason for denying its applicability to oil. A somewhat similar
situation is presented where an oil operator, owning a tract of
land in fee sells it, excepting the minerals and the right of
exploitation and agreeing to pay a royalty upon the minerals
produced from the land. In the one case28 involving such a
situation, the court in effect enforced an implied covenant duty,
although the language of the opinion does not indicate full per-
ception of what it was doing.27 These contrasting situations lend
point to a distinction made by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma,
in another case, which does not seem to afford an apt occasion
for its application,28 to the effect that where the object of the
transaction is not the search for and production of oil, the im-
plied covenants do not apply.
ASSIGNOR RESERVING ROYALTY
Very frequently, when an oil lease is assigned, the assignor
reserves an overriding royalty either as his sole consideration 9
or in addition to a cash price.3 0 The greater number of cases
uphold the existence of the implied covenants for development
and operation in favor of the assignor and against the assignee,3 '
especially where the assignee has agreed to advance money for
the development of the property,3 2 or where the transaction as-
sumes the technical form of a sub-lease. 33 The existence of such
a covenant is denied flatly in one Oklahoma case,3 chiefly upon
the obviously fallacious ground that an implied covenant must
rest upon an express obligation to drill. Later, however, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma was confronted with a suit in which
a lease was assigned subject to the retention of an overriding
royalty by the assignor with a stipulation that the assignor's
26. Jackson v. Texas Co. (C. C. A. 10, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 549.
27. See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. 1940)
§411.
28. Kroeger v. Martin (1919) 72 Okla. 198, 180 Pac. 955.
29. Phillips Pet. Co. v. Taylor (C. C. A. 5, 1941) 116 F. (2d) 994.
80. Cole Pet. Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co. (1931) 121 Tex. 59,
41 S. W. (2d) 414, 86 A. L. R. 719.
81. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. v. Callender (1929) 84 Mont. 178, 274 Pac.
884; Stone v. Marshall Oil Co. (1904) 208 Pa. 85, 57 Atl. 183, 65 L. R. A.
218; Cole Pet. Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co. (1931) 121 Tax. 59,
41 S. W. (2d) 414, 86 A. L. R. 719.
82. Stanolixd Oil & Gas Co. v. Kimmel (C. C. A. 10, 1934) 68 F. (2d)
520.
88. Akin v. Marshall Oil Co. (1898) 188 Pa. 602, 41 Atl. 748.
84. Kile v. Amerada Pet. Corp. (1926) 118 Okla. 176, 247 Pac. 681.
1942]
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rights should extend "to all modifications, renewals, * * * or
extensions" of the original. The assignee attempted to surrender
and to take a new lease before the expiration of the old. Al-
though this was not technically either a modification, a renewal
or an extension, the court refused to allow the assignee to cut
off the assignor's interest in this manner, reasoning that his con-
duct amounted to a breach of a fiduciary relation existing be-
tween the parties to the assignment. 35 The recognition of such
a fiduciary obligation is inconsistent with the conception that an
assignee under such an assignment may do as he will with the
lease, and it may be that the Oklahoma court will desire to re-
examine its earlier decision in the light of its recognition of this
relation of trust.
In another class of cases, the assignor has reserved no perma-
nent interest in the land in the form of an overriding royalty
but stipulates for a payment in oil to be produced from the
leased premises. The majority of the jurisdictions which have
dealt with transactions of this sort have held that, in the absence
of express agreement to do so, the assignee owes no duty to the
assignor to seek to discover and develop production from which
the payment may be made.-3  On the other hand, a number of
cases, chiefly in the federal courts, have affirmed the existence
of implied covenant obligations as essential to enable the assignor
to have a fair chance of receiving the contingent payment for
which he has bargained. 37 In Oklahoma again we find the authori-
ties in some confusion. Two cases are in accord with the numeri-
cal weight of authority.3 8 On the other hand, in Hivick v.
35. Probst v. Hughes (1930) 143 Okla. 11, 286 Pac. 875, 69 A. L. R. 929.
36. Henderson Co. v. Murphy (1934) 189 Ark. 87, 70 S. W. (2d) 1036;
Matthews v. Ramsey-Lloyd Oil Co. (1926) 121 Kan. 75, 245 Pac. 1064;
Goocey v. Hopkins (1925) 206 Ky. 176, 266 S. W. 1087; Smith v. Munhall
(1891) 139 Pa. 253, 21 Atl. 735; Tunstil v. Gulf Prod. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.
1935) 79 S. W. (2d) 657; cf. Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt (Tex. Com. App.
1927) 296 S. W. 491, (Tex. Com. App. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 421.
37. Pritchard v. McLeod (C. C. A. 9, 1913) 205 Fed. 24, 123 C. C. A.
S32; United Central Oil Corp. v. Helm (C. C. A. 5, 1926) 11 F. (2d) 760,
cert. den. (1927) 271 U. S. 686; Van Every v. Peterson (C. C. A. 5, 1928)
24 F. (2d) 26; Mackenzie Oil Co. v. Omar Oil & Gas Co. (Del. Super.
1929) 4 W. W. Harr. 435, 154 AtI. 883, aff'd (Del. 1930) 4 W. W. Harr.
460, 154 Atl. 894; Honaker v. Guffey Pet. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 294
S. W. 259. Cf. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Pendar (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
244 S. W. 184.
38. McGee v. Urschel (1936) 177 Okla. 337, 58 P. (2d) 1228; Phoenix
Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent Pet. Corp. (1936) 177 Okla. 530, 60 P. (2d) 1054,
11 A. L. R. 504.
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Ur8chel,31 an assignee subject to an oil payment, who allowed the
lease to lapse and took a new one for himself, was held to acquire
it impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the assignor
to the extent necessary to cover the oil payment. The court said,
"'By the terms of the contract herein involved, the assignee was
bound to exercise the utmost good faith in the development of
the lease prior to its expiration. '40 This language, as well as the
recognition of the trust, seems thoroughly in disharmony with
the other two decisions. Perhaps this question also is open for
re-examination in Oklahoma.
Except for the fact that the overriding royalty is an interest
in land,4 1 there is so little difference in the situations of the as-
signor retaining such a royalty interest and of the assignor who
stipulates for an oil payment that it seems proper to consider
the merits and demerits of imposing the implied covenant obliga-
tion in both situations together. The argument chiefly relied
upon by the courts which have refused to impose the obligation
to explore and develop is that one of the essential characteristics
of the modern oil lease is the privilege on the part of the lessee
either to develop or to pay delay rentals and at the end of the
exploratory term to let the lease lapse without liability. When
the lease is assigned, it is said, this privilege is transferred to
the assignee, and to imply a covenant for development in the
assignor's favor is to reduce the property right which he got
by his assignment.42 This argument, however, begs the funda-
mental question of what the assignee really gets by the assign-
ment. The privilege of postponed drilling is entirely a creature
of the delay rental clause, which, of course, operates only as
against the lessor. Were there no such clause, the lessor would
be entitled to insist upon prompt exploration. 43 If the assignment
transferred the lease outright, no doubt it would be proper to
say that the assignee acquired the privilege of postponing, or
39. (1935) 171 Okla. 17, 40 P. (2d) 1077.
40. Hivick v. Urschel (1935) 171 Okla. 17, 22, 40 P. (2d) 1077, 1082.
41. Tennant v. Dunn (1937) 130 Tex. 285, 110 S. W. (2d) 53.
42. Matthews v. Ramsey-Lloyd Oil Co. (1926) 121 Kan. 75, 245 Pac.
1064; Goocey v. Hopkins (1925) 206 Ky. 176, 266 S. W. 1087; Simms Oil
Co. v. Colquitt (Tex. Com. App. 1927) 296 S. W. 491, (Tex. Com. App.
1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 421; Tunstill v. Gulf Prod. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)
79 S. W. (2d) 657.
43. See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. 1940)
c. 2.
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even of completely foregoing, development by virtue of the delay
rental clause. But where an overriding royalty or an oil payment
is stipulated for by the assignor, the assignee does not acquire
the full interest which the lessee had as against the lessor. His
interest comes to him burdened, not only with the interest re-
tained by the lessor, but also with the interest for which the
assignor has bargained. This interest is of the same nature as
that which, in the absence of a delay rental clause, has been
adjudged to give rise to the exploratory obligation in favor of
the lessor. No delay rental clause operates against the as-
signor. That the assignor stands in as grave danger as the lessor
of having his interest defeated by the assignee's neglect, the cases
attest. There is, in fact, this distinction, which weighs heavily
in favor of imposing the implied obligation in favor of the lessor,
that when the lease expires without exploration, the lessor will
get his mineral rights back, with whatever wealth there may be
under his land unimpaired, and may try his luck with another
lessee. The assignor, on the other hand, will have nothing. The
really effective argument against implying the covenant in favor
of the assignor seems to me to arise from the fact that most
transactions of assignment will take place between persons en-
gaged in the oil business so that the assignor is much more likely
to be on an equality with the assignee, in regard to knowledge
and to bargaining power alike, than is the lessor with respect
to the lessee. Hence it might be proper to assume that if the
assignor does not insert in the assignment an express obligation
on the part of the assignee to engage in exploratory activity, he
is willing to run the risk of the latter's slothfulness. It is true
that it may not be feasible to place in the assignment specific
provisions as to what wells shall be drilled, or the depth to which
exploration shall be carried, or other details of the exploratory
program,4 4 but at least a general stipulation for exploration might
be inserted. On the other hand, such a general clause would add
nothing to the obligations which an implied covenant would im-
pose, and it may be that the general concept of a duty to explore
which the law of implied covenants imposes upon the lessee or
assignee in favor of the lessor has permeated so thoroughly the
thinking of oil men that the failure to include specific exploratory
44. Cf. the stipulation in Patsy Oil & Gas Co. v. Baker (1927) 127
Okla. 76, 259 Pac. 864.
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obligations in most assignments of the type we are discussing
may be explained on the ground that the parties assume their
existence as a matter of course. As yet, the courts do not seem
to have given attention in their opinions to the relative weight
that should be accorded these factors.
When we leave the realm of the covenant for exploration and
inquire whether the implied covenants for further development,
for diligent operation, and for protection are existent between
the assignor and the assignee, the considerations in favor of an
affirmative answer seem much more cogent. The option to drill
or to let the lease expire upon which the opinions denying the
existence of the covenant to explore have relied so heavily has
passed with the obtention of production upon the premises, or
with the bringing in of adjacent wells which must be offset. The
cry of the assignor for protection against arbitrary conduct on
the part of his assignee is more appealing, for it now is apparent
that his interest can be made fruitful to him. The specific acts
necessary to comply with the obligations of a diligent and careful
operator are so varied and unpredictable that any attempt to set
them down would be futile, and there is no reason for the law to
insist upon the insertion of an empty formula couched in general
terms. In the cases wherein the courts have refused to award
damages to the assignor because of the assignee's failure to oper-
ate the lease, the evidence has shown that profitable operation was
impossible.4 5 In one of them, the court expressly recognizes the
existence of a duty on the part of the assignee to conform to
the conduct of a reasonably prudent operator.4 6 In a very recent
decision the assignee's obligation to protect against drainage has
been enforced, the court expressly saying that the same reasons
which support the implications of a covenant in favor of the
lessor apply in favor of the assignor retaining an overriding
royalty.4 7
A recent Montana case 8 makes an interesting distinction. The
lessee in that litigation, instead of assigning the lease, entered
into what was termed a "drilling agreement" with an "operator"
45. United Central Oil Corp. v. Helm (C. C. A. 5, 1926) 11 F. (2d)
760; Henderson Co. v. Murphy (1934) 189 Ark. 87, 70 S. W. (2d) 1036;
Tunstill v. Gulf Prod. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 79 S. W. (2d) 657.
46. United Central Oil Corp. v. Helm (C. C. A. 5, 1926) 11 F. (2d) 760.
47. Phillips Pet. Co. v. Taylor (C. C. A. 5, 1941) 116 F. (2d) 994, cert.
den. (1941) 313 U. S. 565.
48. Cedar Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Archer (Mont. 1941) 117 P. (2d) 265.
19421
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according to which the latter was to drill certain wells and to
have "the exclusive right to go upon the leased land to explore
for oil and gas. If oil was found, the lessee was to have 712
per cent produced and saved free in the operator's tanks at the
well or to the lessee's credit with such pipe line as might connect
its lines with the tanks. Twenty-five per cent of the gas pro-
duced was retained by the lessee "free of charge at the pipe line"
and seventy-five per cent was granted to the operator. For fail-
ure to drill, as prescribed in the instrument, forfeiture was pro-
vided. The operator was given an option to purchase the lessee's
share of the oil or gas produced from the leased lands at the
wells or in the tanks or in the pipe lines, at the market price.
Gas production was obtained, but only a limited market was
obtainable and a dispute seems to have arisen between the parties
as to who must assume the burden of finding a market. This
dispute culminated in litigation whereby the lessee sought to
cancel the drilling agreement. The second well prescribed by the
contract had not been drilled, but apparently the lessee was
estopped from claiming a forfeiture on that ground by having
indicated a willingness to have the drilling postponed until a
market could be secured for the product. This point is inade-
quately treated in the opinion, and apparently it was not relied
upon by the Supreme Court of Montana. That tribunal devoted
considerable effort to making the point that the drilling agree-
ment could not be considered as a sublease and that the trial
court was in error in giving to the lessee "the status of a land
owner lessor." The court specifically denied the existence of any
implied covenant on the part of the operator to find a market
for the gas. As to the particular agreement and facts in litiga-
tion, the court probably is correct. The express option given the
operator to purchase the lessee's share of the oil and gas implies
rather strongly that the lessee ordinarily will take care of the
task of selling his share. Moreover, even had there been an obli-
gation on the part of the operator to find a market for the lessee's
gas, the evidence showed that a sale to the only purchaser avail-
able was thwarted by the lessee's refusal to sign the contract.
Under such circumstances a lessee would not be liable to a lessor
for failure to market.49 But if the court's opinion is to be taken




as conveying the broad implication that there can be no implied
covenant obligation under such an instrument, its propriety is
doubtful. The position of the parties is substantially that obtain-
ing between an assignor retaining an overriding royalty and his
assignee, and the same reasoning which justifies the imposition
of implied covenant duties upon the assignee seems to call for
their imposition upon the operator under a so-called "drilling
agreement" of this particular type. The court makes no mention
of Sunburst Oil & Refining Company v. Callender,0 in which it
had enforced the implied covenant for operation in favor of a
lessee-assignor, retaining an overriding royalty. Presumably,
therefore, that case is to be regarded as distinguishable and not
as overruled. The most available grounds of distinction seem
to be those discussed above. That the royalty provision is
phrased in terms of delivery in kind is not of itself significant,
for many oil leases read in the same manner, and yet the lessee
is regarded as under a duty to use diligence in providing a market
for the lessor.51
OPERATORS AND GRANTEES OF SHARE-INTERESTS
The Montana case just discussed52 suggests another interesting
inquiry. The operator sold to other persons royalty interests as
a means of raising funds with which to develop the property.
In the end he had left for himself no more than four per cent
of the gas and nine per cent of the oil. What was the position
of his assignees with respect to the activities of exploration, de-
velopment, operation and protection? This is a very common
method of financing oil and gas development. Dependent upon
whether there is an assignment of a royalty interest, or a mere
contract for payment out of the proceeds of production, it ap-
pears that those furnishing money or supplies get either an over-
riding royalty interest, or an equitable lien upon the leasehold
securing an oil payment.5 3 In either case, the same factors which
justify the implication of covenants between lessor and lessee
seem operant. It must be remembered that units or shares of
50. (1929) 84 Mont. 178, 274 Pac. 834.
51. See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. 1940)
§84.
52. Cedar Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Archer (Mont. 1941) 117 P. (2d) 265.
58. See Blake, The Oil and Gas Lease-II (1940) 13 So. Calif. L. Rev.
898, 422.
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this type are sold frequently to people of little acquaintance with
the oil business, and the courts should be vigilant to exact fair
dealing in their favor. It is submitted, therefore, that the im-
plied covenants are existent in favor of the holders of interests
of this sort."5
54. See Merrill, Coventants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. 1940)
419.
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